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Abstract
In Chapter I the author formally defines and discusses the
Active Coordination Problem in hierarchical decision systems. A
brief history is given of past efforts to tackle this problem. And
a paradigm is presented emphasizing important dimensions of the
coordination problem which have been neglected or obscured in
existing theories of coordination.
In Chapter II the author draws upon his paradigm to compare,
contrast, and criticize several models of coordination. Each of the
models is concerned with the coordination of economic systems with
"externalities". Arguments are given for the development of more com-
prehensive and hence useful theories of coordination. The author
feels that it is particularly important that new theories encompass
the game theoretic factors arising from different distributions of
power and information between and across 'levels' of the decision
system.
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Chapter I
The Active Coordination Problem
in Hierarchical Decision Systems
A. Introduction and Statement of the Problem
Problems of active coordination arise in systems where the over-
all objective function associated with the system cannot be optimized
without the conscious intervention of a coordinating agency with in-
formation, power, and goals of its own. Such systems must be distin-
guished from systems in which passive coordination can occur. Here,
the uncoordinated, goal-seeking activity of participants results in
optimal performance of the overall system. The best example of such a
system is that of economic exchange in a perfectly competitive market.
Here, what is best for each individual is best for everyone in a well
known sense. The exchange system is passively or autonomously coordi-
nated by the equilibrium (supply = demand) price vector which results
from the behavior of individual traders. In this essay we shall only
be concerned with the problem of active coordination.
We introduce the active coordination problem with the aid of the
following diagram and the notation of Mesarovic, Takahara, and Macko
(22). Our presentation is reasonably informal. Further on, we form-
alize necessary system relationships when we consider special cases of
the general coordination problem in detail.

-5-
Figure I
supremal
I
'1
iaJ.
IF
I
t I
P or P
Above we indicate the simplest kind of hierarchical decision system:
one with only two decision levels. We shall restrict ourselves to these
systems throughout for two reasons. First, they best exhibit the
structure of the coordination problem. Second, they can be used as
modules in more complex systems.
Identifications:
P is the overall process associated with the system.
P is a collection of subprocesses constituting a decomposition of P.
We discuss the relationship between P and P further on.
c, i = 1, ..., n, represent the n "infimal control units" which exert
decentralized control over P.
C is the coordinating agency, sometimes known as the "supremal unit".
g e G is a representative element of the space of feasible coordination
inputs in the hands of C .
o
m. £ M. is a representative element of the space of feasible control
decisions available to c .
.
1
z. is an information feedback to c. concerning the performance of the
process P or of any subprocess P with which c may be directly
concerned.
w is the "disturbance object" or environmental noise perturbing P.
y c Y is a representative element of the space of possible outputs of the
process P.
w,- is information feedback from c^ to C„.1 -L o
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P: w X M -»• Y (where M = M^ x ... x M ) thus represents the overall
process P as an input/ output system.
Three Decision Problems are associated with the system;
D is the "overall decision problem" reflecting an exogenously given
objective function, for example a Social Welfare Function in an
economy.
D is the set of n infimal decision problems reflecting the goals of
each infimal participant.
D is the decision problem of the coordinator C . We discuss D at
some length further on.
If we assume that D is given and known, and that certain critical
characteristics of the system are known and unchangeable such as the
distribution of power and information, then we can define the Active Co-
ordination Problem as follows:
Def-inition: The Active Coordination Problem is to find a Coordination
Scheme, CS, implying a coordinator decision problem D , such that
there exists a coordination input g* e G with the properties that
a. g* solves D
b. solution of. D ^ implies the solution of D. (Here D
^
represents the infimal decision problems D para-
metrized by g*)
.
In part C of Chapter I we shall discuss the factors involved in
solving this complex problem. For the moment, however, we give a brief
history of efforts to solve coordination problems.
B. The Achievements of Economists and General Systems Theorists
Econimists were the first to attack the coordination problem in
a rigorous manner. Coordination problems arise in economics in the
context of "externalities" or interactions between economic units which
the mechanism of private markets does not cope with 'efficiently'. As
we shall see in Chapter II there are two broad classes of externalities.
"Internalized Pecuniary Externalities", and "Generalized Externalities".
These classifications are discussed in Chapter II.
In the case of each of these broad classes of problems, economists
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have tackled two principal problems. First, they have examined the
question of the existence of optimal coordination inputs - usually
price vectors, or tax/subsidy schemes. Second they have more recently
developed oonstvuctive existence proofs and algorithms for synthesizing
the optimal coordination inputs. For reasons discussed in Chapter II,
we regard these latter efforts as the more significant. (See Weitzman
(30), Davis-Whinston (31), Baumol-Fabian (5), Aoki (2), Hurwicz (17),
Arrow-Hurwicz (4), and Charnes et al. (7)).
The achievement of the economists has been the compilation of a
considerable number of results corresponding to a wide range of coordi-
nation problems. Where economists can be faulted is in their failure
to develop a general theory of coordination from first principles.
There is no general statement of the coordination problem of the kind
given above. There is not even a complete consensus as to the meaning
of "externalities", and as to the respective levels of generality of
the different kinds of externalities problems discussed in the lit-
erature.
The second group to have studied the active coordination problem
is the group of general systems theorists at Case Western Reserve headed
by Mesarovic. Their achievement during the last ten years is to have
developed a unified and general theory of coordination - with limita-
tions which we discuss in Chapter II - but their results have not yet
been applied to specific problems in economics.
The complementary achievements of these two groups makes the
communications gap between them most unfortunate. This paper is
written in part to help bridge the gap.
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We now discuss the General Systems Theory of Coordination. We
motivate our discussion by presenting a concrete model of a system.
We draw extensively upon this model in Chapter II.
Note: In the following model, we restrict ourselves to systems with no
feedback, and no random distrubances from the environment. This is
done to facilitate exposition. The choice for the various spaces of
Euclidean space and the dimensions of the various spaces is arbitrary.
We could just as easily have selected the function space C and con-
sider a continuous time dynamic system rather than the static system
we do consider. Finally, the Euclidean spaces listed below are all
assumed to be endowed with the standard topology.
Model
:
Let i = 0, 1, ..., n index the n infimal control units.
Let M = M X ... X M with representative element m, be the Cartesian
n
Product of the spaces M., "y i, where M. C E is the space of
feasible control decisions of the i infimal, with representative
element m,
.
1
Let U = U„ X ... X U with representative element u be the Cartesian
n
T, L
Product of U, , *^i, where U.C E . ,. j is the space of "inter-
i 1 JTi
action inputs" into infimal unit i from all other infimals, with
representative element u.. L. is defined as the number of outputs
of infimal i. We assume that the sets M. x \J,,*H., are convex.J X i
Let Y = Y X ... X Y with representative element Y be the Cartesian
o n
Product of Y., ^±, where
L, ^
Y.C E " is the space of possible outputs of the subprocess P,
(to be defined below) with representative element y . Here L
the nxjmber of outputs of infimal unit i.
Z L
Let BC E i be the space of feasible coordination Inputs under the
control of the coordinating agency.
Define K = K-. x . . . x K to be the Subprocess Interaction Function where

K , the i interaction coupling function, is written K. : M ^ U.
.
Thus K gives u £ U. as a function of the simultaneous choice
of m = (m^, ... , m ) by the infimals. And hence K: M -> U. K
is assumed to be a differentiable function of each of it* arguments.
Define g: M. ^Y xU.xB^R to be the i infimal performance function,
i. The function g, is assumed convex and differentiable in all
arguments. Denote by g.^^: M^ x Y^ x u^ x b ^- R the function g^
restricted to M. x y. x u^ x b, b e B.
Define G°: M x Y ^ R to be the overall objective function of the system.
It is assumed that G is convex and differentiable in each of its
arguments, and of the additive form
""
- L ^^^-
where a , i = n are non-negative weights.
Define P: M -> Y to be the system input -output map, or "overall process."
Define P = P„, ..., P to be a collection of subprocesses constitutingOn
a decompostion of P. Here, P^ = M^ x U ^- Y . We see here that
the relation between P ;and P is given by the nature of the sub-
process interaction function K. P is said to be a valid decompo-
sition of P iff the relation
y = P (m, K(m)) -f->- y = PCm)
holds for all m e M. The necessary and sufficient conditions for
this relationship to hold are given in Chapter IV of (22).
Define the decision problem D to be: Max G
Define D to be: Max g., ,'^ i, subject to the constraints implicit in
the subspaces of Euclidean space listed above. Functional con-
straints of the form f (ra,u) = are not discussed in this model.
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The Coordination Problem:
Find 1) a Coordination Scheme CS
2) a coordinator's Decision Problem D associated with
CS, and
3) b* e B such that
a. b* solves D
b. the ih solving D also solves D, that is,
m = ($Q m^) = Max g^^^^, i, -"-^ Max G°
m.
1
where "'^" means infimal optimal.
In Chapter II we show in the context of an economic exchange
system that there does exist a coordination scheme known as "Interaction
Decoupling/Interaction Balance" which solves the above problem as long
as we are willing to place one additional restriction on our model:
namely, a restriction on the form of K.
We leave our model at this point to consider briefly the way in
which the systems theorists went about developing the body of results
which we shall draw from in Chpater II.
Recognizing that it was the subprocess interactions which gave
rise to the need for active coordination in systems, Mesarovic et al.
thought up three "modes" in which interaction might be handled. These
three modes are called: Interaction Decoupling, Interaction Prediction,
and Interaction Estimation. Each mode is suited to classes of systems
with specific distributions of power and information, a point which
should have been made and developed by the authors. We discuss this
below in Part C of this Chapter.
The only "mode" interesting to us is the Decoupling mode. In
this scheme the coordinator instructs each infimal to treat the inter-
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face inputs u. as an additional decision variable to be selected at
will as it solves its own decision problem.
Associated with each mode is a formal "principle" of coordination.
These principles are the keystones of the General Systems Theory. For
each principle implies a coordinator decision problem D facilitating
efficient coordination, and each principle is specific enough to be
tested for its applicability in different classes of systems. The
principle associated with the "decoupling" mode is known as the "Inter-
action Balance Principle". It states: the control input m resulting
from the decisions of the infimal controllers solves the overall de-
cision problem D whenever
a. m solves D, and
b. the desired interface inputs u*,V'i, 'selected' by the
infimals balance with (i-e. are equal to) the actual in-
terface inputs u
,
^f'i resulting from application of the
joint control m.
The decision problem D of the coordinator associated with the Decoupling
mode and the Balance Principle is: find b* e B such that the desired
interface inputs assoicated with the solution of the parametrized infimal
decision problem D,^ are equal to the actual interface inputs resulting
from application of the joint control m. We note that D ?* D . Rather,
the coordinator's problem is very special and the coordinator is freed
from having to solve the overall decision problem.
The last four chapters of reference (22) are devoted to providing
partial answers to the following residual questions of interest to the
systems analyst
:
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1. What sets of restrictions on systems are necessary and
sufficient in order that the various "Principles of
Coordination" be applicable to the coordination of
different systems?
2. Assuming applicability, what conditions are necessary and
sufficient for the existence of an optimal coordination
input b* such that a given system is coordinable by b*?
3. If a principle is applicable, but a system is not coordinable
by the principle due to non-existence of a feasible b*,
what strategies of infimal decision problem modification are
available to the coordinator? CThe coordinator can pass
'laws' constituting restrictions on the feasible control
spaces of the infimals. Or he can modify the 'image' held
by the infimals if their decision problems by providing them
with information. Or he can motivate desirable infimal
behavior by providing incentives through taxes, price
schemes, etc.)
C. A Paradigm for Analyzing the General Active Coordination Problem
The theories of coordination of both the economists and the
systems theorists lack generality. As we shall witness in Chapter II,
the several theories abstract from real-world problems of utmost import-
ance in the implementation of any coordination scheme. The primary
shortcoming of existing theories is their failure to take into account
the different distributions of power and information, across and
between levels, which characterize different systems. These factors
are most often "givens" with which a systems analyst must cope.
Furthermore the relationship between power and information will emerge
in Chapter II as the most interesting and significant feature of the
general coordination problem.
The following Paradigm outlines all the factors which we feel
must be accounted for by a general and useful theory of coordination.
It is offered for two purposes. First, it is a step towards making
possible a classification of systems useful for the development of
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coraprehensive theories of coordination. Second, it will serve as a
background for our discussion of several models of coordination in
Chapter II.
^_ The factors requisite for a useful statement of a Coordination
Problem
We propose that planners would be ill-advised to take very seriously a
"solution" to an active coordination problem unless the following di-
mensions of the problem have been analyzed.
1. The cause of the need for coordination: the economist must clari-
fy the kind of "externality" his procedure is designed to treat; the
systems theorist must specify the mathematical form of the mappings
K.
,
(i = 0, ... n) and must express their meaning. (In the last
chapter of this essay we identify flows of commodities, 'public' and
private, between units in an economy, with "separable" or additive
forms of K. in an n-firm world.) The nature of the interaction in-
puts, however, depends upon the system being considered; and the
system itself may be a variable rather than a given. In this sense
K. need not be predetermined. We should wish to know whether or
1
not it is, and this motivates interest in the following two factors.
2. The Power of the Coordinating Agency: What kind of power does
the supremal unit have - i.e. the power of image modification of
infimal problems? constraint modification (he can pass 'laws)? goal
modification (he can implement incentive schemes)? Also, How ex-
tensive is his power of each kind?
3. The set of hierarchical structures or decompositions of the
system which are feasible from the viewpoint of the coordinator:
Whether or not this set is singleton depends upon three- considerations.
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a. To what extent is the coordinator able to change the structure
of a given system by virtue of his power over infimals? The
board of directors of a firm ordinarily has the power to trans-
form corporate management from a functional to a divisionalized form.
The federal government might have the power to alter market
structure by passing laws against collusion or firm size.
b. What are the physical constraints pertinent to a large system?
In questions of regional analysis physical realities might constrain
the set of possible decompositions of a system. In his Synthesis
of Forms Christopher Alexander (1) has developed algorithms for
the decomposition of systems for which physical constraints are
important. He determines for example the optimal layout of an
Indian village given such constraints as the interdependencies of
task requirements.
c. What are the informal information-processing constraints implied
by the overall system? For example, in a given multi-level system
we will wish to determine what information from 'below' a deci-
sion unit might require before he can solve the decision problem
pertinent to his level in the system. One way of visualizing this
was suggested to me by Murat Sertel at the Sloan School.
Suppose that the objective function of an organization facing
an unconstrained optimization problem is written
x' A X - 2 bx + c
First order conditions are naturally given by
Ax - b =

-15-
Consider the following forms of the matrix A.
f
h'
pll ! ^1 ^2 ^13
"^ a^^ A^ = : a-„ a„-
22 2
a33 iO a33
In the case of (A^ ) we have the possibility of totally decentra-
lized infonnation-processing/problem-solving: Simultaneously
three 'divisions' could solve the problems
^1^1 = h
^22'^2 = ^2
^33^3 = ^3
However, in the case of (A ) we imagine three divisions with the
separate decision problems
^11^1 " ^2^2 + ^3^3 = ^
° + ^22^2 " ^23^3 = ^2
+ + 333X3 = b
Informal decentralization here is less possible in the sense that
division 2 (row 2) could not solve his problem without knowing
the solution x„ to division three's problem, and so on.
If we view the 'overall problem' of a complex system as an
information-processing problem (cf. Hurwicz (16)), and if we know
something about the information-processing capability or 'circuitry'
of our system, it is possible that the methods of constructing
minimal realizations of sequential machines may be of use in
synthesizing informationally decentralized systems. (See Algebraic
Struature Theory of Sequential Maahines by Hartmanis and Steams
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(15)).
4. The initial knowledge distribution in the system: for game
theoretic reasons such as the "stability" of infimal decisions, and
for reasons of informational decentralization and efficiency, the
initial distribution of knowledge in a system before a coordination
algorithm begins to operate is of crucial importance. One aspect
of this distribution has been characterized as informational dis-
persion by Hurwicz (16; 17). In general we should wish to know the
knowledge each infimal possesses about other infimals, and the know-
ledge of a decision unit on one level about those on other levels.
By knowledge we mean knowledge about the objectives as well as the
environments (technologies) of the several units. Naturally the
strategy of a coordinator is intertwined with the initial knowledge
distribution. In some cases infimals may already know certain
things which will make certain coordination schemes inapplicable to
the coordinator's decision problem. In other cases the coordinator
can impose laws preventing further communication; or else he can
require that infimals learn certain things about each other: This
strategy would be useful in a situation where the coordinator's
power is very limited and he may have to rely on the infimals to
solve the coordination problem on their own via bargaining and
cooperation. See my discussion of Chidambaram's model in Chapter II.
The coordinator may find that as his coordination algorithm operates
in real time, decision units will learn more and more about other
units. This may cause game theoretic disruptions, for infimals may
learn that they can benefit from "collusion" , to the detriment of
overall system performance. In still other cases the coordinator
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will come to learn more about the constraint sets of the infimals as
a result of the operation of the algorithm even though he knew
nothing to start with. An excellent illustration of this is in
Martin Weitzman's scheme (See [30]) for synthesizing optimal quotas
in economic planning. Initially the central planning board knows
nothing about the infimal possibility sets. Then, at each itera-
tion of the process, an infimal transmits to the coordinator a
hyperplane which is tangent to his production possibility set (30).
In sum, we stress the importance of the initial distribution of
knowledge because
a. too little initial information on the part of unit i
about unit j will render certain coordination schemes
inapplicable;
b. too much inter- level and intra-level information may
render the solutions of certain coordination algorithms
unstable in a game-theoretic sense- (from this point of
view it is interesting that the Chidambaram model dis-
cussed in Cliapter IV turns out to be an "inessential"
n-person game: i.e. cooperation does not help any player)
c. if informational decentralization and dispersion is
essential to the stability and optimality of a coordi-
nation scheme, then knowledge of the tnitiat knowledge
distribution may well be -inadequate for the evaluation
of an algorithm: for learning can take place.
See Hurwicz (16) for a rigorous and extended discussion of "informa-
tional decentralization".
5. As indicated in (4) we must know the kind of communication which
is possible (or which is permitted by the coordinator if he has
such power) between units on the same level and units on different
levels.
6. The Power Relations: a model would not qualify as realistic
without some mention of the power relations within a system other
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than the power of the coordinator. In a two-level system^ for
example, there may be a significant power structure among infimals.
Ideally we wish an indication of
a. power measured not only in terms of what one unit
could possibly do to another unit, but also the
opportunity cost of exercising power (See Harsanyi
[14]), and conversely, the cost of compliance and
non-compliance of those affected by another's power.
b. the distinction between the image and the reality of
the power structure characterizing a system.
These factors will be very important in a game-theoretic sense in
cases wnere the power of tne coordinator is limited. Often the co-
ordinator will have no alternative but to rely upon the infimals to
hash out solutions to their problems via a bargaining process. In
such cases it would be judicious for the coordinator to use his
limited power to establish 'laws' or 'feasible behavior sets' with
the property that the resulting n-person game to be played down be-
low is "stable" (in the sense that it possess a "core", or the
property of inessentiality) . We discuss such considerations in ref-
erence to the Chidambaram model in Chapter II.
7. The set of mathematical relationships characterizing the rela-
tions between the several objective functions in a system, and the
several constraint sets. An important role in the General Systems
Theory of coordination is played by the concepts of "balanced con-
straint sets," and of "inter level/intralevel harmony" of objective
functions. These concepts are discussed and formalized in reference
(22). We expect to see increased discussion of these and other
hitherto unmentioned aspects of multilevel decentralized systems as
ways of determining what principles of coordination are applicable
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to what classes of systems.
So much for the factors involved in stating a coordination
problem.
B. Prerequisites for an acceptable solution to a coordination
Problem
1. To what extent does the author recognize and factor out the
considerations raised in part (a) above? It is particu-
larly interesting to see whether authors distinguish be-
tween the goal of the coordinator and the "overall goal"
of their system. Traditionally they have not.
2. Whether or not an analyst addresses himself to the detailed
considerations of part (A), we are still interested in evalu-
ating his solution with respect to:
a. how 'power-decentralized' the coordination procedure is
(With respect to this, appearances are deceptive: for
example we are about to see that the decompostion method
used by Baumol-Fabian is not in fact power-decentralized).
b. how informationally decentralized the procedure is. The
focus here is on the initial knowledge distribution; in-
formation transmitted during the operation of the algor-
ithm; and the knowledge required by the several decision
units to solve their subproblems.
c. the informational and computational efficiency of the
procedure. Very technical questions arise here which
are of utmost importance to planners but not to us in
this paper. For instance, what is the dimensionality
of the message vectors transmitted during the process?
How difficult is it for each unit to solve the necessary
equations (i.e. optimization problems) at each iteration?
How rapid is convergence?
We now discuss several models of coordination from economics
drawing on the framework provided by this chapter.
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Chapter II
The Problem of Active Coordination
in the Context of
The Externalities Problem of Economics
Keeping in mind the analytical paradigm of the last chapter, we
proceed to focus on several alternative approaches to coordinating
economic systems with externalities. Our aim is
1. To show the similarities and differences of the several
models, and their complementarity;
2. To demonstrate that the emphasis of economists on solving
specific problems has deterred them from constructing
a general theory of coordination. In contrast to this is
the fact that a complex economic coordination problem
can be solved by a very special case of the General Systems
Theory model - as the reader will see;
3. To demonstrate the need for more general, comprehensive
theories of coordination providing for game theoretic
factors arising from the distribution of power and in-
formation between and across levels of a system;
4. To reveal the existence of a trade-off between the
knowledge and the power of the coordinator in a system
as the dominant feature of the active coordination prob-
lem.
While we do not checklist each of the models against the eleven factors
of the coordination paradigm, the ensuing discussion should make clear
the significance of all of the factors to the study of coordination, and
the present lack of any truly thorough study of the problem.
A. The Case of "Internalized Pecuniary Externalities"
We start with a rather restrictive yet fruitful kind of external-
ity problem. "Internalized pecuniary externalities" (IPE) arise when,
for example, several divisions of a firm compete for scarce resources
such as corporate funds or machine hours which are of limited supply.
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(The latter is known as the "facility assignment problem" in the lit-
erature. ) The coordination problem is that of how to allocate the
scarce resource among competing divisions so as to maximize corporate
profit. In the case of IPE, the activity (e.g. production level) of
one infimal unit does not affect the performance of other infimals.
This latter and more general kind of interaction is treated in section
B.
We draw upon three models, two of which are unknown by economists
and are unpublished: Baumol and Fabian {5], Chidambaram [8], and
Lasdon and Chidambaram 18, 18], While Baumol and Fabian claim that
their "decomposition" mode of coordination can be generalized to
cover a broader class of externalities problems than IPE, we are only
interested in this more restricted problem, - for which their algorithm
was in fact designed.
THe IPE problem will arise in three different "power vs. informa-
tion" contexts in our discussion. In the first context, the coordina-
ting agent need not /does not possess knowledge of the n sets of division-
al constraints (technologies), but the agent must have the power to
impose the final production plan upon the divisions. In the second
context, the coordinator knows all the constraints but he wishes to
solve the allocation problem by pricing alone since he cannot impose
a solution. The question here is: Under what conditions does there
exist a set of prices which will coordinate the system, and what are
the optimal prices? In the third context, the coordinator must have
knowledge of all the constraint sets, but he does not/need not have
the power to impose final outputs. However he must have the limited
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power to reject infimal production plans which violate certain con-
straints, and to penalize lawbreakers. We call this last scheme
"coordination via provisional goal modification."
1. The Baumol- Fabian Model
a. The authors' results"
Baumol and Fabian show that the Dantzig Decomposition algorithm
provides a special set of prices which can be used for decentralized
decision-making in the presence of externalities of the IPE variety.
They also show that there exist situations where an optimal price
vector does not exist, and hence where an optimal output plan must
be dictatorially imposed.
b. A formal statement of the problem:
We take the case of a firm with two divisions. Division 1 can
produce either or both of two commodities whose outputs are represented
by X and X . Similarly, three potential outputs of Division 2 are
denoted Y^ , Y„, and Y,. Both divisions make use of a common corporate
resource whose supply is limited to quantity C^ . Division I's output
is also limited by the capacities C and C. of two of its own resources
needed only by itself; and similarly Division 2 has a resource con-
straint C,. The overall problem is written for simplicity as a linear
programme
:
Max P = P,X- + P-X„ + P Y_ + P,Y„ + P.Y-11 22 31 42 5j
s. t.
(1) a^^X^ + a^2^2 +
-13^1 + ^14^2 "^ ^15^3 ^ ^1
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^21^1 -^ ^22^2 ^ S
^A -^ ^32^2 :^ S
^3^1 + %4^2 -^ W3 ^^4
All.X, Y >
where
P is total company profit
P. Is the profit per unit of output j
a., is the amount of input 1 required for unit output j
Note the "block-angular" divisional constraint sets: some constraints
contain only X variables, and some contain only the Y variables. The
decomposition algorithm described below is in general only applicable
to problems with this property.
c. Solution via the decomposition algorithm of Dantzig:
We summarize how the decomposition algorithm works assuming that
the reader is somewhat familiar with the method. The coordination
procedure is iterative:
1. First, headquarters assigns arbitrary unit profit parameters P
to the respective divisions.
2. Each division then submits to the corporate office an output plan
which is the solution of its own "isolated" profit maximization
problem in which the assigned P. are used.
3. Using the divisional output proposal, the company solves a "Master
Program" of its own. More accurately it "pivots" this program
for a one-step improvement. Solution of this program permits the
company to determine the benefit or burden the given output propo-
sal of Division i places on Division k. On the basis of the solu-
tion of the problem dual to the Master Program, the company re-
calculates the P profit parameters, submits the new P to the
respective divisions, and requests a new output proposal.
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4. The process is iterated a finite number of times in which an optimal
solution to the Master Program is guaranteed if the program is
linear.
5. From the final solution of the primal problem of the Master Program
the company can synthesize a final optimal, feasible divisional
output plan which in general must be "imposed" upon the divisions.
For, in general, the constraint sets of a given problem preclude
the existence of a price vector which could guide the system to
overall optimality in a genuinely decentralized manner.
d. Appraisal
The Baumol-Fabian algorithm would not qualify as a solution to a
coordination problem from the standpoint of Messarovic because at no
stage of the procedure do solutions by the divisions of the parametrized
infimal problems imply solution of the overall problem. In most cases,
the coordinator synthesizes the solution of the overall problem as a
convex combination of a series of infimal problem solutions, and then
imposes this solution by fiat.
However, the procedure is relatively informationally decentralized
and efficient inasmuch as the coordinator need not know anything about
the technologies of the divisions at any time. The procedure is re-
strictive in its requirement of block angularity: It thus does not
apply to cases of outright "technological externalities" which are the
more general and interesting ilk. The question of whether communica-
tion and bargaining among the divisions would lead to an overall opti-
mal output cannot be answered since the authors typically overlook the
specification of information and power networks among the divisions.
Later we shall see the key role played by just such considerations.
The mode of coordination is strictly "goal" modification. Neither
"constraint" nor "image" modification are considered.
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2. The Lasdon-Chidambaram Model [8, 18]*
Lasdon and Chidambaram consider a problem mathematically similar
to but contextually different from that examined by Baijmol and Fabian.
The situation is as follows. N individuals compete for r scarce re-
sources which are taken to be machines. A per-unit-of-service utility
coefficient u . is associated with unit use of facility j by individu-
al i. The "corporate constraints" are expressed by scalars n, which
gives the total capacity of machine j, v j- The infimal constraint
sets are "block angular" as in Baumol/Fabian and gives the total units
of service (a.) which each individual must receive from some combina-
tion of usage of the r machines. A coordinator is charged with the
problem of allocating facilities. The overall problem can be written:
Choose (x,,, . . . . , x^ ) so as to
Max u, ,x. T + .... u,, X-,11 11 Nr Nr
s. t.
(6) x^^ + .... x^^ = a^
^21+ •••• ^r ^ ^2
"^1 "^ • • • • V " ^N
^11 +^21-" •••• +^N1 -^
x^2 + ^22 + . . . . + x^2 1 "2
X, + x„ +....+ X., "^ n^
Ir 2r Nr — r
x^^ > Vi, Vj
*There is no such model. Rather the author has synthesized it from
results of the two authors for the sake of comparison.
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X. . is of course the units of service received by division i on machine
j. For consistency it is assumed that L,n. _^ ^a., that is, the re-
quirements of each division will be met; but the overall optimal allo-
cation will not in general maximize the objective functions of the
several divisions each of which faces the problem:
Max u.,x.- + .... +u. X.
il il ir xr
s. t.
(7) (x.^, ..., x^^) >
X.T+...+X. =a.il ir 1
Hence the need for coordination.
The behavioral context of the problem differs radically from the
case examined by Baumol-Fabian. The coordinator does not have the
powev to impose an overall-optimal solution on the divisions. The
only power he has is that of setting prices. However, the coordinator
is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the infimal constraint co-
efficients, a,, and u,.. We have traded off power for knowledgel
i ij
The relevant problem then is: Under what conditions is the
system ooordinable by a price vector, and what is the optimal price
vector? That is, can we use the goal modification to construct a
modified problem in which infimal optimality will imply overall opti-
mality? We state the answer to the above problem very compactly.
The Lagrangean of the primal problem (6) can be written
N r N r
(8) L(x; A, m) = ) ) x. . (u. . - A . - m.) + ) Xa. + ) m.n.
i=l 3=1 i=l j=l
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where (A, m) are lagrange multipliers. Now let X° and m° be the dual
variables corresponding to the solution {x } of the primal problem.
Suppose the coordinator sets a "price" (tax) of (A! + m°) for the use
of facility j by infimal i. Then i's modified utility ooeffiaients
u! . = u., - (A? + m!); i = 1, ..., N
j = 1, ••• , r
Does this new price vector (u') coordinate the system and lead
to the overall optimal allocation x!,? Chidambaram proves the following
theorem which gives sufficient conditions for coordinability via (u').
Theorem [(8); p. 37]: Sufficiency: If the optimal solution of the
primal programming problem (6) is unique and such that no capacity
constraint is limiting, then in the game with modified utilities
u!. = u. . - A? - m°
the individuals choose the overall optimal allocation.
Appraisal : In situations where the sufficiency theorem holds, Lasdon
and Chidambaram have developed an algorithm which solves a genuine co-
ordination problem. Using the modified utility parameters u'
.
, each
individual while acting in his own best interest guides the system to
an overall optimum.
The drawback with the procedure is the requirement that the co-
ordinator possess knowledge of the total constraint matrix. The pro-
cedure is thus not informationally decentralized.
Independent analysis by Chidambaram shows that if we view the
"modified" problem as a N person game, not only does it have an equi-
librium (as we have just seen), but it is "inessential" as well.
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Inessential games have the property that cooperation is of no use.
Thus the Lasdon-Chidambaram model implicitly applies to cases of gen-
eralized communication and power structures between infimals. Neither
"bargains" nor "coalitions" benefit any players. We say implicitly be-
cause the point is not made by Chidambaram.
With respect to informational/computational efficiency the authors
have little to say. If N is very large then the corporate programming
problem will be very time consuming.
3. The Chidambaram Game Theoretic Model
Chidambaram [(8)] has conceptualized the problem of hierarchical
coordination in a bold, new manner. He proposes the following situation.
A coordinator has full knowledge of an overall problem. (Remember that
in general this need not or even should not be so.) That is he knows
both overall (corporate) constraints and infimal constraints (tech-
nologies). But his powers of implementation of the overall solution
(which he can determine) are very limited. Specifically, the coordin-
ator only has the capability of formulating and communicating to the
infimals a "probabilistic acceptance function" which gives his prob-
ability of rejecting a given strategy of a given infimal. It is un-
derstood that the coordinator has the power not only to reject a strat-
egy but to penalize the said infimal for violating corporate constraints
by proposing it. In effect we have coordination via aonstraint
modification and by provisional goal modification. That is, goal modi-
fication (punishment) is conditional upon violation of a constraint.
Chidambaram proves that in very general situations there exist
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simple probabilistic acceptance functions which are sufficient to
coordinate the competitive situation. The situation is analyzed as
an n-person game, both cooperative and non-cooperative. We learn
that "games" coordinated in the above manner possess unique equilibria
which are overall optimal, both in the cooperative and non-cooperative
case!
Chidambaram restricts himself to the class of "choice-conflicting"
but not "utility-conflicting" competitive situations. His results for
this class are very general. We now define this class of interest.
Definition: Let W be the space of admissible strategies for in-
fimal i. Let x. be the strategy of infimal i. Let u. be the utility
1 1
function for infimal i. Let R be the overall feasible region or "con-
straint space" of the corporation. Then a coordination problem is called
"choice-conflicting" if (W. x W„ x ... x W.,) is not a subset of R.° 1 2 N
The problem is called non-utility-confHating if
u.(x^, ..., X., ..., x^) = u^(x.)
for all i and (x , . .
.
, x ) e (W x . . . x W ) . Restriction to the
class of "choice-conflicting" situations is equivalent to restriction
to the case of internal pecuniconj externalities which we have been
considering. And "utility-conflicting" problems are equivalent to
technologiadl externalities. For these latter, Chidambaram derives
only one result. We now turn to the model,
(i) Assumptions:
S is the set of N individuals or players, s is any subset of S
and (i) is the singleton set consisting only of player i. A Game is
denoted by G. W is the pure strategy set of the i player with

-30-
tjrpical member x.. A mixed strategy for i is represented by a cumu-
lated probability distribution function F.(-) over W . If s is a sub-
set containing players (i, •••> ^) then 2£ represents the vector
(x., ..., x^). F^Cx^) is a distribution function over W the Cartesian
product of the spaces (W. , ..., W ).
X = (x^ , ..., X ) is a "play," where x eW.. Constraints upon the
choice of strategies can be written as non-linear inequalities
(}).(x^, ..., X ) _< j = 1, ..., r (the number of constraints)
Let R be the constraint space, that is
R = {x|(J)(x) < 0}
Corresponding to each play x there is a utility u.Cx^^, ..., x^) to the
i player. These are bounded functions defined over R. There is also
a function c(x) giving the payoff to the coordinator from play x.
Definition : A coordination problem as distinct from a control problem
has the property that
N
c(x) =2- a^u^Cx)-
That is, the coordinator is concerned with maximizing total utility
(or some linear combination of it)
.
Over (W,xW-x . . . x W ) we define N probability acceptance functions12 n
q.(x , ..., x^) ; i = 1, ..., N. These functions take on values in the
closed interval [o, 1] and represent the probability of the coordinator
accepting the i player's strategy in the play (x) . The coordinator
has the power to manipulate these functions q . (x) subject to the follow-
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ing three constraints
:
= 1 for1. q.Cx^, ..., X., ..., ^)
i = 1, . . . , N JF (x^, . . . , x^, . . . , Xj^) e R
2. Let an arbitrary play x i R* In this play let there be a
positive probability that the set of individuals s^ is
accepted (i.e. q.(x) > 0, i e S ) and the set s^ rejected,
where the sets are disjoint and exhaustive of S. Then we
require that for any i £ s„, there exists no
s - (i) s - (i)
Y ^ e W
such that
s s - (i)
(x , Y , X.) e R,
and
3. For similar definitions of the sets s^ , s„, there exists a
^2 ^2Yew
such that
1 2(x , Y ^) e R
The first constraint says that if the individuals come up with any
play that is in R, then the coordinator must accept it. The idea
behind the second constraint is that the coordinator should accept
as many strategies in a play as possible. An analogy from the
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facility assignment problem would be that if k > n. individuals compete
for the j facility in a given time period, then only (k - n.) are
rejected. The third condition is that any group s which is likely to
be accepted should have a joint strategy x which is feasible. While
constraint (1) is critical for Chidambaram's results, the other two
are not: they are merely introduced to limit the coordinator's strength
and thereby to strengthen the meaning of the results.
The coordinator has the power to define penalty functions (m )
which represent the expected pay-off to a player in the event that his
play is rejected. These functions are of course defined over x.
We restrict these functions in the following manner: if an individual
i is rejected, his eventual payoff m. (x) cannot exceed the maximum i
can get if he were allowed to choose any other strategy from W. subject
to the constraint R.
The expected payoff to the i individual under a mixed strategy
(F^(.), ..., Fj^(.)), denoted by M.(F^, ..., F^) is:
M,(F^, ..., F^
^ ^\\
""l\ ^^^^- ^i^-^ "-"i^-^ ^' 'i^-^^^
. dF^(x^) .... dF^(x^)
where p.(x) is the payoff to i in the play x ^f he is accepted. We see
here how the q functions selected by the coordinator affect i's pay-
off. Thus the q. are the coordination parameters of the problem.
Corresponding to every (q.(x); i = 1, ..., N) that the coordinator can
select there is a N-person game GCq) in which the i player has a pure
strategy space W. and has a payoff from the play x equal to:
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e^CjO = P^Cx) q^^Cx) + m^(x)Il - q^Cx)]
(ii) The Problem:
The Ovevall Probtem: Find x so as to maximize c(x) subject to
(j)(x) £ 0; X e (W^x .... xW ) . Let jf be the solution to this non-
linear programming problem. This is the solution the coordinator
would impose had he the power to do so.
The overall problem stated as a coordination -problem: As coordinator,
find (q.^); i = 1, . . . , N) subject to the constraints (1-3) above such
that x(q), the strategies adopted by the N individuals in the game
G(q), meiximize c (x)
(iii) Results of the analysis:
Case I: "Choice" but not "Utility" conflicting situations: The Non-
Cooperative Game GCq)
Consider any probability acceptance functions q. satisfying assump-
tions (1-3) above and further satisfying
4. q^(xj^ , ..., x^, ..., x^ ) = if
(x^ , ..., x^, ... , x^°) ^ R;
and
q^(x^, ..., x^°, .... Xj^) = 1 for all
(x^, ..., x^°, ..., x^) e (W^x xW^)
where (x^ , . .
.
, x^ ) is any solution of the overall optimization
problem.
Theorem 1: For the non-cooperative game G(q), with q satisfying (1-4)
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above, (F , . .
.
, F ) is an equilibrium strategy set, F being
defined by
F. =
; 1 if u. (x.) > u. Cx.°)11 — 11
otherwise
Theorem 2: If the game G(q) has multiple equilibria, then they are
equivalent (i.e., each equilibrium yields the same payoff to i)
.
Theorem 3: Under an equilibrium strategy F. for i, only pure
(as opposed to randomized) strategies x are chosen. And these strat-
egies give an expected payoff of exactly u, (x ).
Theorem 4: Assume that the coordinator selects the penalty functions
m. such that player i's expected payoff conditional upon rejection,
m.(x.) is less than the payoff associated with any strategy x. e W.
subject to the constraint R. Then if (x , ..., x^ ), the solution
to the overall optimization problem, is unique, the equilibrium point
(F , ..., F ) defined above is the unique equilibrium point of the
game G(q).
Case II: Choice-conflicting games: The Cooperative Case
Definition: The characteristic function (V(*)) of a game is a set
function defined over all the subsets s of S in the following manner:
V Cs ) = max min E M
. (g , d
)
ieS ^
+ 4-
g £ X d e X
S - s
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where M is the payoff to player i, and where X is the mixed strategy
space of the group of individuals s, and X that of the complemen-
tary group.
Theorem 5: For the game GCq)
V(s) = L u.(x. ); for all s c: S
ieS ^ ^
implying therefore that GCq) is "inessential." Thus cooperation is
of no use and hence the "solution" of the game is "stable."
Case 3: Utility-conflicting as well as Choice-conflicting Games
Theorem 6: Take a general coordination problem subject only to con-
straint (1) given above. If there exist acceptance functions
Cq. (x, , ..., X ); i = 1, . .
.
, N) such that the pure strategy (z.
,
..., z ) is an equilibrium point of the game G(q), then (z^ , ... z )
*
is also an equilibrium point of the game G(q*) where the function q.
satisfies not only constraint (1) above but also for all i = 1 ... N
*
q^ (x^, ..., z^, . .. , Xj^) = 1 for all
(x^, ..., z^, .... x^) e (Wj^x ... xWjj) ;
and
q^ (Zj^, ..., x^, .... Zj^) = if
iz^, ..., x^, ..., Zj^) ^ R.
We can interpret this as follows. If a strategy z_ is not in equilibrium
i
i
*
under a set of functions (q ) as defined above then we conclude that
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there exist no q. functions where (z) will be in equilibrium. This
result is more important than it may appear to be at first sight.
As Chidambaram points out, the result shows the usefulness of the power
to establish the feasible space R. A coordinator with this power can
therebly "break" or relax constraint Cl) above which must be done if
the coordinator wishes to achieve equilibrium but cannot achieve it
under functions of the form q. . However, in many real world cases
coordinators would not seek an "equilibrium" solution. Rather they
should foster cooperation between players if the interests of collecti/e
rationality are to be served.
B. The Case of Generalized Externalities: Models with Technological
Externalities and Consumption Externalities (i.e.. Public Goods)
The family of externalities discussed in Chapter II Part A above
is rather "bloodless", to use Baumol's term. Of far greater interest
are economic environments with both "technological" and "consumption"
externalities. We call these generalized externalities. Formally,
they arise when the outcome of an activity of an individual unit in
the economy depends not only upon its own input of commodities private
to that unit, but also upon the activities of other units, which give
rise to non-private market interactions between units. By the "outcome
of an activity" we mean the performance of a productive unit (profit)
in the case of production, and utility in the case of consumption. Thus
the case of generalized externalities embraces both technological ex-
ternalities and consumption externalities. Following Aoki [2] we
assume that generalized externalities are measurable and associate
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measurable connnodities known as public commodities with these ex-
ternalities. Finally we denote economies with public commodities as
generalized economies.
Our purpose in this consluding section of the essay is to ex-
amine two models of the coordination of generalized economies. The
first is the work of an economist, Aoki. It is an exceptionally
fine contribution to the recent effort to develop constructive exist-
ence proofs of optimal coordination inputs in complex systems. The
reader will see how Aoki's model embraces questions of informational
efficiency and decentralization. However, we shall fault Aoki for
failing to discuss, or for treating unrealistically , important aspects
of the knowledge, power, and communications structure of his system.
The second model is a non-constructive proof of the existence of
an optimal coordination input in a generalized economy formulated as
a General Systems Theory model. Our purpose here is to show that the
new theory of Mesarovic et al is applicable to familiar problems. Our
systems theory model is isomorphic to Aoki's model, however diffemt
the two are in appearance. The most interesting difference between
the alternative formulations (excluding the fact that our proof is non-
constructive) is the emphasis placed upon flows of commodities be-
tween units in the General Systems Model.
1. The Aoki Model
In an unpublished paper Aoki {2] presents two algorithms for the
coordination of a generalized economy by a central planning board (CPB).
We shall restrict attention to the first model where coordination inputs
are prices, prices of both private and public commodities. The reason
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for this is that the coordination via pricing is analogous to Mesarovic's
"decoupling" mode of coordination with inf imal performance modification
via linearized goal-interaction operators. Aoki's second model proposes
coordination by means of iteratively announced prices of private goods,
but supplies Cquotas) of publia goods. This model is informationally
more efficient than his first model. However, to formulate this scheme
in terms of General Systems Theory would require the use of both the
"decoupling" mode of coordination and the "prediction" mode. For con-
venience in exposition we restrict our attention to the simpler case of
pricing coordination.
a. Necessary and Sufficient conditions that a given price vector in
a generalized economy be optimal
Before discussing Aoki's scheme for synthesizing an optimal price
vector, we shall characterize the economy formally and cite the Samuel-
sonian conditions for optimality generalized by Aoki to the case where
public commodities are not only public goods for final demand but also
intermediate goods in the process of production (i.e., technological
externalities)
.
There are m production units each identified by a superscript i
running from 1 to m. s is the number of commodities of which the first
m are public. It is assumed that the j public commodity is supplied
only by the j unit. Now let
X. = the amount of commodity j delivered for final use (j = 1 . . . s)
y. = the amount of commodity j produced by the i unit. A negative
value refers to an input. (i = 1 ... ni; j = 1 .... s)
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2. = the amount of public commodity j produced by the j unit
J a = 1 .... m)
w. = the amount of private commodity j initially available
J (j = m + 1, ..., s)
The technologically feasible production set facing the i unit
is represented by an s-tuple y = (y^ , .... Y ), satisfying the
relation
F^(y^) = (i = 1, .... m)
j
3f/
J
th .^ . ^ ^, ^^ ^ J , ^, .thF / implies that the i unit is externally affected by the j
unit. The objective function of the economic organization is given as
a social welfare function by
u(x) = u(x
, . . . , X. , . . . , X )
-L J S
Denote -r— by u . . The final delivery of commodity j is equal to
the total available from production plus the initial stock. Thus
z. (j = 1, . . . m)
^- = <
J 1 ™ •
H Y.^ + w. (j = m + 1, ... s)
,
i=l ^ ^
Naturally x >_ and u . >_ (for all j = m + 1, ... s) and a strict in-
equality holds for at least one j Cnon-satiability)
.
Associated with the optimal allocation y* (which maximizes u
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subject to the above constraints) are the following price vectors:
q.''' = the shadow price of the j public commodity for the i
-' unit (1, j = 1, . . . m; j ^ i), giving a vector of (m^ - m)
prices
;
q. = shadow supply price of the j public commodity (j =1, . . . m)
p. = shadow demand price of the j commodity for final use
^ (j = 1, ... s).
The total number of prices necessary for coordinating via a pricing
mechanism is thus (m^ + s). Implicit here of course is the fact that
shadow prices for a given public commodity differ across those who de-
mand them. The shadow supply price for a given public commodity is the
sum of the shadow demand prices over "intermediate" and "final" con-
sumers. This fact appears explicitly in the following characterization
of the social welfare optimum of our generalized economy. We now state
the necessary (and sufficient, if all F are convex) conditions for
optimality. Let y* be the optimal allocation and let F. * denote the
F. evaluated at y*. Then
3
(1) u* = p. a = 1 .... m)
(2) u* < p.; if u* < p, then x* = (j = m + 1 ... s)
m
(3) q.-' £ p. + E q/; if q.-^ < p. + Z q/, then
=0 (j = 1 ... m)
J ~ j i=j j j j i=j J
(A) f/* q/
-^— = ->— (i, j = 1, ... m)
F * P
s s
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(5) F. * P.
<
s
F * P.
J 3
; if : < — then
F ^* P
y. * =0 (i = 1, .
J
.m; j=m+l, ...s)
b. Tl-ie synthesis of the optimal price vector
The following scheme by Aoki is an "artificial market" scheme of
the kind discussed by Buchanan and Stubblebine [6]. Thus for the j
public commodity, j = 1 • . . m, m independent artificial markets are set up,
one each between the j unit and every other unit. Iterative bargaining
in these markets then determines the optimal output of the public good.
Aoki typically does not require artificial markets between producers of
externalities and non-productive aonsumers of the public commodities in
the consumption sector. He does not need to since as we shall see a
"helmsman" is assumed to have perfect information about consumer pref-
erences in the form of u(x). This is of course a weakness of the model.
Aoki assumes an environment with the following hierarchical
structure:
CPB
Firm 1 Firm m
Helmsman
Consumers
The "helmsman" is an agent of the central planning board and is assumed
to have power to reallocate resources according to an ethical criterion.
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and to have perfect information about consumer preferences. We now
give both the "message symbols" and the "response rules" which character-
ize the synthesis algorithm.
a. Message symbol of the CPB : At iterative time t e (o, T) the CPB
announces the price of the j private commodity p. (t) (j = m + 1 .... s)
.
At the same time it sends to the i unit (respectively the helmsman)
the non-uniform-between-units price of the j public commodity q (t)
(respectively p.(t)) for j = 1 . . . . m. At t = the CPB message may
be arbitrary, subject only to the constraint
q.^(O) = p.(0) + E q.^(O) (j = 1 .... m)
which is the restriction on the shadow supply price for the j public
good by equation (3) above.
b. Message symbols of the i unit (respectively helmsman): At iterative
time t, the i unit (respectively helmsman) sends to the CPB his demand
for (supply of, if negative) the j commodity y, (t) (respectively the
final demand x.(t) of the helmsman) for j = 1, ...., s).
th . . t -th _
c. Response rule for the i unity: At iterative time t the i unit
is instructed to calculate the inputs and outputs of private and public
commodities that maximize its net revenue using the prices dictated
from the CPB. That is subject to F.(y.) _< it solves the maximization
problem
m . s
Max Y. q. (t) y/ + E p.(t) y/
j=l J J j=m+l ^ ^
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The solution is sent to the CPB as y, (t) for j = 1, ..., s. Thus each
unit not only specifies inputs and outputs of private goods, but of
the levels of externalities it regards as desirable. Note that this
mode of coordination is identical to Messarovic's notion of interaction
"decoupling" whereby each infimal selects the "level of the interaction
inputs" from the other infimals in such a way as optimizes his sub-
problem criterion.
d. Response rule for the helmsman: At iterative time t, the helmsman
is instructed to maximize the difference between utility and the cost
of production taking the prices set by the CPB. Thus he sends up to
the CPB as x.Ct) the maximizer of the problem
s
Max U(x) - Z p.(t)x.
X j=l ^ ^
e. Decision rule of the CPB: the CPB adjusts the prices of all com-
modities iteratively according to the economist's law of excess demand
and Messarovic's principle of coordination via "interaction balance"
(by which desired interaction inputs come to equal actual inputs).
The adjustment formulae are:
p^(t) = 3j(Xj(t) - y-j^(t)) j = 1 ... m
if p.(t) = and x.(t) - w. - Z y.^(t) <
J J J i=i J
P,(t) =S
^
i
I
n .
b.(x.(t) - w. - Z y.'^(t) j = m + 1 ,.. s
J J i=l
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qht) = g.(|y^(t)| - y^Ct)) (i, j = 1, ...m; j 4 1)
q^(t) = p,(t) + Z qj(t) j = 1 .... m
where (a , b , and g) are positive constants and where p = dt. The third
of these equations represents the artificial markets set up between the
supplier of a public commodity and every other unit. This was dis-
cussed above. The price of the j public commodity to the i unit
(or to the helmsman) rises if his demand exceeds the j unit's supply,
and falls otherwise. The first equation is the "law of supply and de-
mand for private goods" with the qualification that if the price is zero
and the excess demand negative the price remains at zero.
Aoki's algorithm has several weaknesses which should be pointed
out. The process will not necessarily yield a feasible plan after a
finite number of iterations. Second, even if T ->• °^ , the production
functions must be striatly convex. Aoki's second model guarantees
feasibility after a finite number of iterations and merely requires
"semi-convexity" of the technologies. However this model will not be
discussed for reasons given above.
c. Appraisal
Aoki's paper is an articulate statement of and solution to a
complex problem of active coordination. Convergence properties of the
algorithm are discussed. The dimensionality of the necessary messages
is discussed. Results concerning the degree of computational complexity
follow straightforwardly according to the case of interest. For example,
the utility functional might be exponential and the technologies Cobb-
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Douglas , i. e.
,
m . aj s , 3j
F'(y') =y '- n |y^| n |y/| .
j = l
J j=ni+l J
Aoki's scheme is a "valid" solution of a coordination problem in
Mesarovic's sense since the problems defined for the "infimal" units
and for the coordinator constitute true divisions of labor. That is,
no one unit is charged with solving the overall optimization problem
of determining an output and price vector which maximizes producers
and consumer well-being simultaneously. Rather the coordinating CPB
merely changes the coordination inputs (prices) so as to balance supply
and demand while the infimals optimize their subproblems with respect
to the given coordination parameters. In fact, Aoki's scheme is equiva-
lent to coordination via Mesarovic's "interaction balance" principle.
The weakness of Aoki's model lies in his formulation of the de-
cision problem of his "Helmsman", and in his failure to specify certain
characteristics of the economic system he is describing. These character-
istics will partially determine the success of any coordination algorithm.
First, there does not exist any Helmsman with perfect information about
every consumer's preference schedules, much less with the computational
ability to iteratively solve the decision problem he is charged with
solving. Moreover, we can expect the infimals to lie to the Central
Planning Agency in solving their decision problems for the simple reason
that they are being asked to part with information (about desirable
levels of public commodities) which it is not in their interest to give
out. For except in the trivial case where no infimal knows or learns
anything about the preferences for prospective public commodities of
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other infimals we can expect ' freeloading' , bargaining, or possibly
blackmailing! Mancur Olson (25) and Paul Samuelson(26) have discussed
such problems. Thus, it is essential to specify assumptions concerning
the distribution of knowledge and power in the system, and concerning
the 'rules of the game' te.g. no inter- infimal communication).
Without such knowledge, it is not only difficult to predict which
'second-best' solution an algorithm will arrive at, but it is also dif-
ficult to determine the game theoretic 'stability' of the outcome.
Ironically, only the best solution, i.e. that derived by Aoki, is
known to be stable. For Duncan Foley (13) has shown that the Public
Equilibrium represented by the quintuple <w * y* ; p_; q_ ; q. > is the
core with respect to w of the economic game being played by the part-
icipants. Even stability in this case is suspect, however, because
of the peculiar definition of "blocking" used by Foley in defining his
2. A General Systems Theory Model of the Coordinability of Generalized
Economies
We conclude this essay with a demonstration of the existence of
an optimal coordination input, i.e. a price vector, in a generalized
economy. The mode of analysis is that of the General Systems Theory
of Coordination discussed in Chapter 1. We emphasize that the following
proof is not constructive, and hence is much less interesting than the
constructive proof of Aoki. Hov;ever , our purpose is merely to show
the applicability of the Systems Theory to a system familiar to social
scientists. What seems of particular interest to us is how simple a
system an economic exchange system is. This simplicity will be apparent
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when we discuss the form of the subprocess interaction function K.
Consider a generalized economy identical to that discussed in
the preceeding section. At this point we ask the reader to briefly
review the model formulated in part B of Chapter I, for that is the
model of our economy. In order for that model to make sense, of
course, we must make the appropriate identifications which we now
proceed to do. We assume that all restrictions on the spaces and
functions of the model introduced in Chapter I hold below.
Let i = 0, 1, ... n index the n infimal units. (0, ..., n-1) are
productive units in the economy. Unit n is the 'Helmsman" who
is assumed to have perfect knowledge of a Social Welfare Func-
tion.
Let M. , i = 0, ..., n-1 be the set of feasible activity levels at which
the infimal managers can operate their plants, and let M be
the level of demand for "consumption goods" specified by the
He Imsman
.
Let U., i = 0, ..., n-1 be the space of all possible flows of commodities
to infimal i from all other infimals. In the case where "other"
infimals means other plants, then u. represents the amount of
"intermediate" commodities delivered to infimal i. In the case
where "other" refers to the Helmsman, unit n, then the commodity
flowing to i from n is simply the level of demand by the Helms-
man for i's products (including any externalities or public
commodities). U is the space of all possible flows of final
goods delivered to the Helmsman by the other (n-1) infimals.
We shall clarify the meaning of these Interaction spaces below
when we discuss the mapping K.
Let Y., i = 0, ..., n-1 be the space of possible outputs (of public and
private commodities) of infimal i. Y refers to the final bill
of goods which the Helmsman can actually deliver to the
consumers.
Let B be the space of feasible coordination inputs at the disposal of
the coordinator, here a Central Planning Board. For our pur-
poses b e B is non-negative price vector. These serve as "goal-
interaction operators."
n
Let K. , i = 0, . .
.
, n be written as K. (m) = u. = I K^.(m.). Here
u. . = K, . is to be understood as the j=0 flow of
commodities from the infimal j to i. jfi Further-
more, because we shall be invoking the "decoupling" mode of
coordination (discussed
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below, u.. can be interpreted as the amount of conmodities pro-
duced by infimal j that infimal i "demands". The above
form of K. is known as an "additive separable" representation
of K.. It is justified by the nature of interactions in an
economic exchange system. All we have done is to formalize the
fact that the inputs into one infimal from all other infimals
can be represented as a sum of the interface inputs once all
commodities are normalized and made oomparable by the intro-
duction of a price vector b. In a similiar manner we denote
u.. = K..(m.) to be the amount of its own output y. which in-
^^ Ji 1 fimal i "offers" to the other n-1 infimal units
in the economy. There need be no confusion over the fact that
firms do not in fact make separate offers of their outputs to
other firms and to consumers. Separability here is only used
for formal reasons which will shortly be understood.
Let g., i = 0, ..., n-1 be the i infimal's performance function,
'here taken to be the difference between costs of intermediate
goods inputs u, from other firms, and costs associated with
operation of plant facilities at a given level (e.g. de-
preciation costs), and revenues from the delivery of its out-
puts y. to the other infimals. g , , the performance function
of the Helmsman, is the difference between the cost of a
certain consumption bill, and the level of social welfare associ-
ated with the bill by the Welfare Function, g., , "V" i, are to
be maximized.
Let G° , the overall objective of the economic system, be to maximize
profits (if we take a production viewpoint) or to maximize
social welfare if we take a consumption viewpoint.
Let P. i = 0., ..., n-1 represent the function giving the output of
"'' the i infimal unit as a function of the interraediate goods
delivered to him, and of the level of activity at which he
chooses to operate his plant. P is a trivial correspondence
between the bundle of 'final goods' commodities actually de-
ilivered to the Helmsman, the bundle desired by the Helmsman, and
the bundle going to the consumers. Naturally, each of these
three bundles is the same at equilibrium.
It remains merely to specify the decision problem D of the co-
ordinating agency. We assume decoupling coordination is the scheme
used, since it is the only scheme at all compatible with the kind of
system being considered. In this case, D consists of finding a price
vector b* such that the desired interactions between the n infimal
units are equal to the actual interactions: in other words, a price
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which equates the supply and demand of flows of commodities between
units.
We now state the theorems guaranteeing the existence of an optimal
price vector in our system. These have been adapted from (22) where
more general versions - i.e. versions embracing general linear topologi-
cal vector spaces - are proved.
Theorem I: If the coupling functions K of a system are additive and
separable, then infimal performance modification through-
out the system via a choice of b e B has the property of
being "zero-sum" when desired and actual interface inputs
are in balance.
Theorem II: If the functions P., g., , and K. , ^^ i , are dif ferentiable
i ib iin each of their arguments; if the overall
objective function G associated with the system is add-
itive and admits of an overall optimal control m (we assume
that this holds); if the sets M. x U., ^f" i, are convex;
if g,, , V^ i, and G are convex; and if performance mod-
ification is "zero 'sum": then the system is indeed coordin-
able by the Interaction Balance Principle. That is, there
exists a price vector b* such that the solution via the
Decoupling mode by infimals of their parametrized decision
problems D implies a solution of the overall decision
problem D. And b* also solves the coordinator's de-
vision problem D .
Theorem II when extended to general linear spaces is one of the
richest theorems in the new General Systems Theory of Coordination.
While the result is exciting, it must be pointed out to what extent
this existence theorem is silent upon questions of the distribution of
information and power in systems. - questions essential in the appli-
cation of any theory of coordination. Constructive existence proofs
like that of Aoki are more useful if only because they make explicit
the flows of information necessary for the synthesis procedure to work.
The feasibility of obtaining such flows in light of the power and in-
formation network of a given system can then be analyzed separately
pending the development of more comprehensive theories of coordination
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of the kind we have argued for in this essay.
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